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_____________
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Petitioner,
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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__________________________________
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________________
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

MS. SHARI MAO
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

Whether the Court considers the totality of the circumstances when determining if a
defendant has standing to challenge the search of a rental vehicle.

II.

Whether Petitioner had standing to challenge the reasonableness of the government’s
actions.
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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts have not been reported. The opinions
appear in the record.
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or thing to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on November 12, 2008. R. 25. Petitioner filed his
petition for writ of certiorari on December 14, 2008. R. 26. This Court granted the petition on
March 7, 2009. R. 27. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000).
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 3, 2008, in anticipation of the holiday, Officer Womack, along with an increased
number of officers, patrolled a neighborhood known for drugs. R. 3. Womack stopped a car
speeding from a suspected drug den. R. 19. The driver, Tim Riggins, presented the officer with
his valid driver’s license and the rental agreement for the vehicle. R. 19. The rental agreement
had only the defender’s wife as an authorized driver. R. 19. Because Tim Riggins’ name was
not listed as an authorized driver, the officer asked to search the car. R. 3. Riggins refused the
search, but was asked to step out of the vehicle. R. 4.
During the search of the vehicle, the officer discovered a taped brown paper bag
containing 500 grams of cocaine in the unlocked glove compartment. R. 20. He also found a
plastic bag with chemicals commonly used in the making of “crystal meth,” along with various
personal items. R. 20. The officer arrested Riggins. R. 4.
Riggins claimed that his wife had given him permission to drive the vehicle. R. 20. He
had the keys to the car and the glove compartment on his key chain. R. 20. The credit card used
to rent the vehicle listed Mr. Riggins as the primary card holder. R. 20.
Riggins moved to suppress the evidence claiming that the evidence was uncovered in a
manner that violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. R. 19. The district court denied Riggins’ motion, and the appellate court affirmed the
district court’s ruling. R. 25. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari. R. 27.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.
The Court need not consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether
an unauthorized driver has standing to challenge a rental vehicle search. In order to have Fourth
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Amendment standing, an individual must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy that is
supported by property law or an expectation of privacy that is recognized and permitted by
society. An unauthorized driver has neither ownership nor a connection to the rental vehicle that
is recognized or permitted by society. Therefore, the Court does not need to consider the totality
of the circumstances to determine that an unauthorized driver does not have standing.
II.
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights and may not be vicariously asserted.
Riggins must show a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy in the property searched
in order to prove that he is not vicariously asserting his rights. Riggins demonstrated a
subjective expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, but he failed to demonstrate an objective
expectation of privacy supported by property law or recognized by society. Since he does not
have both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy in the property searched, he does
not have standing. Therefore, since he does not have Fourth Amendment standing, he cannot
challenge the reasonableness of the government’s actions.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT NEED NOT CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN DECIDING WHETHER AN UNAUTHORIZED
DRIVER HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE A RENTAL VEHICLE SEARCH
The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable governmental searches and

seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and effects. U.S. Const. amend. IV. These rights
protect people, and not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). Yet, the extent
in which people are protected depends on where those people are. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S.
83, 88 (1998). Accordingly, the level of Fourth Amendment protection varies according to the
place searched. See id. The sanctity of a home demands a stringent level of Fourth Amendment
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protection whereas a highly regulated vehicle conveys a minimal expectation of privacy. See
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-393 (1985).
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and may not be vicariously asserted.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). Thus, a proponent of Fourth Amendment rights may
establish standing to challenge the government’s actions only if his own rights were violated by
the search or seizure. Id. at 132. To prove that a proponent’s own rights were violated, the
proponent must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property searched. See id.
at 143. In other words, he must demonstrate that he personally had an expectation of privacy in
the property searched, and that this expectation was reasonable. See id.
The legitimate expectation of privacy is often discussed in terms of a subjective and an
objective component. See id. A burglar present in a summer cabin during the middle of winter
illustrates a subjective expectation of privacy. See id. The burglar is justified in his expectation
of privacy. See id. Yet, he is a trespasser because he is present without the permission of the
owner. See id. Therefore, his subjective expectation for privacy is not only rejected by property
law, but is also rejected by society. See id.
It is insufficient for a proponent of Fourth Amendment rights to claim merely a subjective
expectation of privacy. See id. He must manifest an objective expectation of privacy as well.
See id. Ultimately, a proponent of Fourth Amendment rights must demonstrate a legitimate
expectation of privacy supported by concepts of property law or accepted and permitted by
society. See id.
A person who owns or lawfully possesses a property is likely to have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in that property because of his right to exclude. See id. Circuit courts
have generally held that a person who owns or leases a vehicle has Fourth Amendment interest.
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See United States v. Walker, 237 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, circuit courts have
generally held that an unauthorized driver who neither leased nor owned the vehicle will not
have standing to contest the legality of the search. See United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 586
(6th Cir. 2000). However, circuit courts split when deciding whether an unauthorized driver not
on the rental agreement has a legitimate expectation of privacy if an authorized driver grants him
permission to drive. See id.
The majority view applies a bright-line approach holding that an unauthorized driver does
not have standing to challenge the search of a rental vehicle. See, e.g. United States v. Boruff,
909 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle was not
authorized as a legal operator of the vehicle, therefore does not have standing). These courts
affirm that the true owner of a property has the right to exclude all others from that property. See
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. However, a subset of this majority deviates from the property concept
and applies a modified bright-line approach. They grant the unauthorized driver standing if that
driver can prove that he had permission from the renter of the vehicle. See United States v.
Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1995).
The minority view applies a totality of the circumstances approach. These courts claim
to follow the Rakas Court’s concurring opinion stating that the Fourth Amendment is not an area
of law in which bright-line rules will benefit public interest. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156 (Powell,
J., concurring). This minority assesses a checklist of factors to determine whether an
unauthorized driver has standing. See, e.g., Smith, 263 F.3d at 586.
The modified bright-line and the minority approaches have both deviated from the
Supreme Court holding that requires the legitimate expectation of privacy to be supported by
concepts of property law or understandings permitted by society. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
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The modified bright-line approach inadvertently dismisses the concept that an owner of a vehicle
has the right to exclude, and holds that a mere renter may convey an expectation of privacy to an
unauthorized driver. See Muhammad, 58 F.3d at 355. The totality of circumstances approach is
based on a misinterpretation of a Supreme Court concurring opinion. See Smith, 263 F.3d at 586.
Both approaches overlook the established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the privacy
expectation in vehicles is not analogous to dwelling places. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148.
It is the pure bright-line view that remains true to Supreme Court holdings. This
approach asserts that a legitimate expectation of privacy must be supported by concepts of
property law or understandings permitted by society. See id. at 143. This view affirms the
repeated Supreme Court holdings that vehicles have a diminished expectation of privacy as
compared to that of a home or an office. See id. It affirms that the true owner of a vehicle
retains the right to exclude unauthorized drivers. See Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117. Ultimately, it
supports the importance of a readily administrable rule in support of the government’s interests
in an area where individuals already have a weak expectation of privacy. See Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
A.

The Modified Bright-Line Approach Overlooks Property Law and Societal
Understandings of Privacy

While a clear majority of jurisdictions apply the bright-line approach by refusing an
unauthorized driver standing to challenge a search of a rental vehicle, a subset of these
jurisdictions have adopted a modified bright-line approach. This subset concludes that
permission from an authorized driver may convey standing to an unauthorized driver. The
Eighth Circuit Court confirms that an unauthorized driver without permission to drive the vehicle
will not have standing. However, it then reasons that an unauthorized driver who acquires
permission to drive the vehicle from an authorized driver will acquire standing to challenge a
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search. See Muhammad, 58 F.3d at 355 (holding that the defendant may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in a vehicle if he had permission from the renter based on the holding in
United States v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254 (8th Cir. 1994)). But see United States v. Gomez, 16 F.3d
254, 256 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that the defendant had permission from an authorized driver of
a vehicle lacked standing because he did not have permission from the owner of the car). The
Eighth Circuit Court fails to recognize that permission granted by an authorized driver is not the
same as permission granted by an owner. The owner has restricted the driver’s rights to the
scope of the rental agreement. See Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117 (finding that the lease agreement did
not give renter the authority to grant control of the rental vehicle to the defendant, an
unauthorized driver).
A rental company grants a driver limited authority over the vehicle as delineated in the
rental agreement. See id. (explaining that the authorized driver was the only legal operator of the
car and did not have the authority to grant control of the vehicle to the defendant, an
unauthorized driver). Rental agreements do not grant drivers the ability to freely designate
unauthorized drivers without the rental company’s knowledge. See id. Therefore, an authorized
driver does not have the capacity to grant an unauthorized driver permission to drive the car. See
id. Likewise, the authorized driver does not have the capacity to convey a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the car. See id. Since the legal operator of the vehicle cannot convey rights to an
unauthorized driver, an unauthorized driver will not have standing. See id.
Some circuit courts have adopted the modified bright-line approach using a different set
of reasoning. These courts conclude that the mere violation of a lease agreement does not
destroy standing. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1400 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a lessee who has retained possession of a rental vehicle past the expiration of the
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lease maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car). These courts reason that if an
authorized driver retains a car past the expiration of the lease, then he would be in violation of
the rental agreement. See id. Driving a car with an expired rental agreement is not a violation of
the law. See id. Thus, the mere violation of a rental agreement should not negate a driver’s
legitimate privacy interest in the vehicle. See id. Therefore, even though the legitimate driver is
in violation of the rental agreement, his expectation of privacy in the vehicle should not expire
when his rental agreement expires. See id.
Under this set of reasoning, violating a lease agreement by maintaining possession of the
rental vehicle should not eviscerate the legitimate expectation of privacy if an individual had
possessory rights prior to the expiration of the agreement. See id. Accordingly, if the driver had
standing to begin with, the lease violation will not destroy it. See id. However, if a driver did
not have standing, a contract violation should not convey an expectation of privacy where there
was none. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141 (affirming that by virtue of his wrongful presence, a
defendant will not have standing to challenge a search).
The Ninth Circuit Court argues that an unauthorized driver may demonstrate an
expectation of privacy that society is willing to accept through “joint control” or “common
authority” over the property searched. See, e.g. United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d. 1191, 11981199 (9th Cir. 2006). It asserts that the “joint control” standard is based on certain Supreme
Court holdings. See id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit adopts a modified bright-line view that an
individual without possessory rights may acquire standing if he has joint control over a vehicle
with an authorized driver. See id.
The Supreme Court has held that a person without property rights may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in another’s property that society is willing to permit and accept. See
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Carter, 525 U.S. at 89. Certain fixed structure, such as a home or an office, may convey an
expectation of privacy through societal customs. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 155 (Powell, J.,
concurring).

The Ninth Circuit Court supports its modified bright-line approach by reasoning

that joint control over a vehicle is the same as joint control over a fixed structure. See Thomas,
447 F.3d at 1198 (likening the privacy from the joint control of an apartment in Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) to the privacy from the joint control of a rental vehicle). This
reasoning directly contradicts the Court’s history of holding that cars are not to be treated the
same as houses or other fixed structures for Fourth Amendment purposes. See United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (affirming a Fifth Circuit Court holding and
reversing a Ninth Circuit Court holding by emphasizing that an individual’s expectation in a car
is not as stringent as the sanctity of a dwelling).
The Supreme Court emphasized that the extent of a person’s Fourth Amendment
protection depends on where the person is and whether the person has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 88. The Court has held on numerous
occasions that individuals do not have the same expectation of privacy in cars as they do in
houses or apartments. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148. This is because cars are highly regulated and
subjected to pervasive government inspection and requirements, unlike a home. See Carney, 471
U.S. at 392.
The Court illustrates the difference in societal expectation of privacy between homes and
vehicles through its holdings. It held that an overnight guest in a host’s home has a legitimate
expectation of privacy based on societal customs. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98
(1990). The Court reasoned that individuals may spend the day in public places, but will seek
out a shelter in a home with the expectation of privacy at the end of the day. See id. In contrast,

8

the Supreme Court held that passengers in a vehicle, even with the permission and in the
presence of the owner, do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at
148. The Supreme Court held that the expectation of privacy in another’s car is simply not
analogous to the expectation of privacy in another’s home. See id. Therefore, joint control over
a mere rental vehicle will not convey the same expectation of privacy as joint control over the
sanctity of a home. See id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s application of joint control as a basis to
justify an unauthorized driver’s expectation of privacy in a rental vehicle is not based on privacy
concepts acknowledged by the Court or by society. See id.
The pure bright-line view, in contrast, reaffirms that a legitimate expectation of privacy
must be supported by concepts of property law or societal understandings. See id. at 143. This
approach applies the concept of property law in emphasizing that the rental company is the
rightful owner of a rental vehicle and maintains the right to exclude. See United States v.
Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the appellant may have the authorized
driver’s permission to drive the car, but he did not have permission from Hertz company, the
owner of the car, therefore, the appellant does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
rental vehicle). The rental company has the right to grant control of the vehicle to authorized
drivers and to exclude unauthorized drivers. See id. An unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle
does not have permission from the rightful owner. See id. Therefore, the unauthorized driver
does not have an expectation of privacy supported by concepts of property law or societal
understandings. See id.
The unauthorized driver commits a direct interference of the vehicle without the owner’s
permission. See Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117. Since the unauthorized driver’s presence is
“wrongful,” he is a trespasser. See id. Like a burglar in a summer cottage in the off-season, an
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unauthorized driver may have a subjective expectation of privacy but not one that society is
willing to accept. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141 (criticizing circuit courts for holding that a person
in a stolen automobile should have standing to object to its search, despite the Supreme Court’s
holding that standing would not be availed to those who are wrongfully present).
An unauthorized driver is a trespasser and has no legitimate expectation of privacy that
property law or society is prepared to accept. See id. at 143. A trespasser is present in the
vehicle without the permission of the true owner. Not only does he not have an expectation of
privacy in the vehicle, he does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any of the
vehicle’s compartments. See Wellons, 32 F.3d at 119 (concluding that a person without a
legitimate claim upon a car may not reasonably expect the car to be a private repository for his
effects). An unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle will not have standing to challenge a search
in any part of the vehicle because his expectation of privacy is not supported by concepts of
property law or societal understandings. See id. Therefore, in examining an unauthorized
driver’s expectation of privacy through property law and societal permissions, the pure brightline approach remains true to the holdings of the Supreme Court. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
B.

The Totality of the Circumstances Approach is based on a Misinterpretation

Nevertheless, a minority of jurisdictions depart from the bright-line approach by urging
the adoption of a totality of the circumstances view in determining standing for an unauthorized
driver. See Smith, 263 F.3d at 571. It suggests a checklist of factors to apply in reviewing the
facts in light of the surrounding circumstances. See id. The Sixth Circuit Court refers to the
Rakas Court’s concurring opinion stating that search and seizure is not an area of the law in
which any bright-line rule would preserve both Fourth Amendment rights and the public interest.
See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156 (Powell, J., concurring).
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The totality of the circumstances view does not follow the Court’s holding that a
legitimate expectation must be supported by concepts of property law or societal permission.
See id. at 143. This minority view suggests that to determine whether the legitimate expectation
of privacy was reasonable, the court must examine all the facts in light of the surrounding
circumstances. See Smith, 263 F.3d at 586. One factor examined is whether a driver had a valid
license to drive a vehicle. See id. Another factor examines whether the driver is able to provide
the rental agreement as well as details regarding the vehicle. See id. Although these factors may
serve as a basis for forfeiting an individual’s rights to drive a car, these factors do not establish
privacy rights through property law or societal permission. See id. (citing to cases where
standing was rejected because the unauthorized driver did not have a driver’s license or was
unable to provide a rental agreement).
This minority view considers whether the unauthorized driver had received permission to
drive the vehicle from an authorized driver. See id. As discussed, legal operators of a rental
vehicle do not have the legal authority to convey possessory rights to unauthorized drivers. See
Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117. This invalid conveyance is not supported by property law or
understandings of society. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. Therefore, such a conveyance will not
establish an objective basis for a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id.
Another factor that the court considers is whether an unauthorized driver actually paid for
the rental vehicle. See Smith, 263 F.3d at 586. The court argues that if an unauthorized driver
was the de facto renter of the vehicle, he will have standing. See id. This argument is not
supported through concepts of property law or societal understandings. See id.
The rental company did not grant permission to the unauthorized driver to control the
vehicle. See id. The unauthorized driver is not on the rental agreement, and therefore, the
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company is not on notice that he is exercising control over its property. See id. Therefore, the
unauthorized driver is a trespasser because he did not receive permission to control the vehicle,
but merely paid for someone else’s use of it. See id. Thus, his unauthorized control over the
vehicle is not supported by property law or understandings of society. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at
143.
The Sixth Circuit Court asserts that the totality of the circumstances view is a loyal
interpretation of Justice Powell’s concurring opinion. See id. at 155-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
However, this view takes Justice Powell’s comment out of context. See id. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Powell illuminated the well established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by
distinguishing the diverse range of expected privacy among various types of property. See id. at
154. He asserted that the minimal privacy of a vehicle is not comparable to that of an abode.
See id. at 155. Consequently, he refused to draw a bright-line rule in general Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence across all types of property, including vehicles, apartments, phone booths, and
footlockers. See id. at 156.
Notably, the vehicle is one category of property that the Supreme Court has drawn brightline rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See id. at 153-54 (emphasizing that in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, nothing is better established than the distinct difference between
one’s expectation of privacy in a vehicle versus any other location). From the time when cars
became part of the American landscape, the Supreme Court has held that a driver’s expectation
of privacy in a vehicle is substantially diminished compared to that of a dwelling house. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). The Court has found that passengers who
neither owned nor had a possessory interest in a vehicle do not have a legitimate expectation in
the car searched. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148. The Court recently concluded that an owner in his
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motor home has a lowered expectation of privacy, simply because the motor home is heavily
regulated and is inspected more like a vehicle than a fixed structured home. See Carney, 471
U.S. at 153.
Throughout Fourth Amendment history of the United States, the Supreme Court has
created and sustained bright-line rules within one area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See
id. That one area is vehicles. See id. The Court’s bright-line rules within Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence are consistent in holding that a vehicle has a weak expectation of privacy. See id.
C. A Bright-Line Rule Supports Law-Enforcement without Breaching a
Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
The Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of “readily administrable rules” in Fourth
Amendment jurisdiction. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001). It warns
that standards requiring “sensitive case-by-case” analysis do not serve the Fourth Amendment
balance, lest every judgment made by law enforcement becomes an opportunity for
constitutional review. See id. By limiting variables to a very specific set of circumstances
regarding a specific type of property, a bright-line rule will weigh in favor of the needs of law
enforcement against an ordinarily weak personal-privacy interest. See Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 306 (1999) (concluding that “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment must
weigh in favor of law enforcement in properties like vehicles where personal-privacy interests
are typically weak). Therefore, a bright-line rule will support the government in circumstances
where the individual’s expectation for privacy is traditionally minimal, but the law enforcement
interests at stake are significant. Id. at 304.
A proponent of Fourth Amendment rights must demonstrate that he had an expectation of
privacy in the property searched and that this expectation is supported by concepts of property
law or interests recognized and permitted by society. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. An
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unauthorized driver does not have the basic requisites necessary for standing, therefore, totality
of the circumstances need not be considered when concluding that an unauthorized driver does
not have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a search. See id. Though an unauthorized
driver may develop a subjective expectation of privacy in a rental vehicle, he is unable to acquire
a legitimate expectation of privacy from the permission of an authorized driver. See id.
Therefore, the modified-bright-line approach should not be applied. See id.
The bright-line approach recognizes that an unauthorized driver without the permission
from the rental company does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. See id.
Since an unauthorized driver’s interest in the rental vehicle is not based on property law or
societal customs, he does not have the requisites necessary to achieve a legitimate expectation of
privacy. See id. Without a legitimate expectation of privacy, an unauthorized driver fails to
establish standing. See id. In an area of where individuals already have a weak expectation of
privacy, a bright-line approach will support the government’s interest through a readily
administrable rule. See id. Therefore, the bright-line rule will affirm that an unauthorized driver
of a rental vehicle will not have standing to challenge the government’s actions. See id.

II.

RIGGINS DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S ACTIONS
An individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the property searched is required for

Fourth Amendment standing. See id. The legitimate expectation of privacy is discussed in terms
of a subjective and an objective component. However, a subjective expectation of privacy is not
enough. Ultimately, the privacy expectation must be one that society is willing to recognize or
one that is supported by concepts of property law. See id. at 143.
Riggins claims that he had an expectation of privacy in the rental car. He had received
permission from his wife, the authorized driver, to use the car. R. 20. The credit card that she
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used to rent the vehicle was a joint account and Riggins was the primary card holder. R. 20. He
had personal effects throughout the car and had been using the car, and therefore, he claims that
this proves joint ownership of the property. R. 20. Here, his subjective expectation of privacy in
the vehicle is not enough. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. He must also demonstrate that his
expectation of privacy is one in which society is willing to accept and is validated by referencing
concepts of property law. See id.

A.

Riggins does not have Possessory Rights over the Vehicle

Even though Riggins is the primary card holder of the credit card that his wife used to
rent the vehicle, the rental company did not give Riggins permission to have control over the car.
See Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117. Riggins never communicated with the rental company regarding the
rental. R. 19, 20. Since the company was unaware of his unauthorized control over its property,
Riggins does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle. See Boruff, 909
F.2d at 117.
Riggins may argue that the violation of the rental agreement does not destroy his
standing. Here, the rental company lawfully owns the car and has the right to exclude all others.
See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. The owner had granted permission for usage to the authorized
driver, Riggins’ wife. R. 19. The rental company did not permit Riggins’ wife to transfer
control of the vehicle to a third party. See Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117. Though Riggins received
permission from his wife, she did not have the legal authority to give him permission to have
control over the vehicle. See id. Under concepts of property law, Riggins has no legal or
legitimate possessory control over the property. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. Riggins’
expectation of privacy remains subjective. See id.
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Here, he does not have the permission from the rightful owner of the property and is not
listed on the lease agreement. See id. His expectation of privacy not only violates a lease
agreement but this expectation is not supported by concepts of property law. See id. Therefore,
the contract violation could not have destroyed his standing because, in fact, he never had
standing. See id.
Riggins may claim that he had an expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or the
plastic bag to contest the government’s search. See Wellons, 32 F.3d at 119. Riggins may argue
that he had the keys to the glove compartment and the capacity to exclude others under property
law. R. 20. Yet, he did not lock the glove compartment, signifying his lack of subjective
expectation of privacy. See Wellons, 32 F.3d at 119. Not only did he not have a subjective
expectation of privacy, he was also exercising dominion over the car without the consent of the
owner. See id. A person without possessory rights of a vehicle cannot legitimately expect the
vehicle to be a personal repository for his private effects, even if the items are in an enclosed
container or taped shut. See id. at 120 (holding that a person without a claim to the rental car
cannot assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in a bag found in the car). Therefore, Riggins
did not demonstrate a subjective or an objective expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle nor
any repository within it. See id.
The capacity to challenge a search requires that the individual demonstrate a legitimate
expectation of privacy supported by concepts of property law or understandings of society. See
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. Riggins does not have a possessory right in the rental car or its glove
compartment. See id. Since Riggins does not have a possessory or ownership right in the car, he
lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy supported by property law. See id.
B. Riggins’ “Joint Control” over a Vehicle does not Convey a Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy
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Here, Riggins may argue that he does not need to own the property in order to seek
protection and standing under the Fourth Amendment since he had joint control over the car. He
may claim that several Supreme Court holdings have held that property rights are not conclusive
in determining Fourth Amendment standing. See id. Therefore, standing should not be based
solely on ownership or property rights, but understandings of society. See id.
The Supreme Court has held in several circumstances that an individual may have a
legitimate expectation of privacy through “joint control” over a property that he does not own,
such as an apartment, an office, or a telephone booth. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 87-91. Under this
analysis, Riggins may claim that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy because he had “joint
control” in a vehicle with his wife who had possessory interest in the car. In certain Supreme
Court holdings, an individual may acquire standing through “joint control” over a fixed structure,
such as a house or an apartment. See id. However, society recognizes that the minimal privacy
in a vehicle is not comparable to the sanctity of a house or an apartment. See Carney, 472 U.S.
at 392-93.
The extent to which individuals are protected by Fourth Amendment rights depends on
where those individuals are. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 88. Riggins’ joint control over a vehicle
with a minimal expectation of privacy will not yield the same privacy as the joint control over a
house or an apartment. See Carney, 472 U.S. at 392-93. Therefore, Riggins does not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy that is acknowledged by the Court or society. See id.
Riggins does not own the rental vehicle, and has not received possessory rights from the
rental company. R. 20. Therefore, he does not have a privacy expectation supported by concepts
of property law. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. Riggins’ joint control over the vehicle does not
yield the same level of privacy as the joint control over a residence. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428
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U.S. at 561. Therefore, he does not have a privacy expectation supported by understandings of
society. Since Riggins does not have an expectation of privacy that is supported by concepts of
property law or is permitted by societal understandings, he does not have standing to challenge
the reasonableness of the government’s actions. See id.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent respectfully prays that this Court will not consider the totality of the
circumstances when deciding if an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle has Fourth
Amendment standing to challenge a government search. Since an unauthorized driver does not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy that references concepts of property law or
understandings that are accepted by society, he does not have standing.
Riggins is an unauthorized driver, and does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
that references concepts of property law or understandings that are accepted by society.
Therefore, Riggins does not have standing to challenge the government’s actions. For these
reasons, Respondent prays this Court affirm the decision of the court below.
PRAYER
For these reasons, Respondent prays this Court affirm the decision of the court below.
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Counsel for the Respondent
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